

forage for its immense cavalry establishment, which rendered no decisive service in the War, and the transport which should have been used to feed the cities was diverted to the feeding of idle horses and useless horsemen. Here in Britain, whilst we were short of shipping for imperative war demands and our food supplies from overseas were becoming more and more precarious, we were allowing our own fertile soil to go out of cultivation without making any effort to keep up its yield of essential food. What is the explanation of so obtuse and general a neglect of this vital war front ? The War, in the view of the experts chiefly concerned with its direction, was an affair of the manoeuvring and clashing of armies and navies. The food problem ended with the field kitchen. This was due to the general assumption that war on so colossal a scale could not last long. On *Disbelief* *fat* *int* *both* *pacifist* *and* *militarist* *in a* *long war* *could agree to sit on the same parapet in complete accord. The pacifist predicted that the financial bankruptcy of nations would quickly supervene, and that the fires of war would soon die down for lack of fuel. He held, too, that the deadliness of modern weapons would effect losses so ghastly that after a short experience men would refuse to face them. The militarist was convinced that the onslaught of his huge armies with their shattering equipment would prove*

irresistible, and  
that complete victory could only be a  
matter of a few  
months. It is a proof of the tenacity with  
which a  
rooted conviction clings that neither the  
men of peace  
nor the men of war were able to change  
their outlook,  
even after the battles of the Marne and  
of Ypres  
had revealed the inconclusive  
character of the